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Egocentrism has been linked to damage to the right cerebral hemisphere (RHD). 
Egocentrism in this population has been reported in discourse production, as those irrelevant or 
tangential comments that are inappropriately personal; for example, they contain personal 
opinion, or include comments in which the speaker places himself as a character in the story 
(Blake, 2008).  While egocentrism has been shown to affect discourse production of individuals 
with RHD (Chantraine, Joanette & Ska, 1998; Lojek-Osiejuk, 1996; Mackenzie, Begg, Lees & 
Brady, 1999), less is known regarding the effect egocentrism has on text comprehension. To 
date, few empirical studies have been conducted to examine how egocentrism may contribute to 
the comprehension deficits of individuals with RHD.  However, intuitively, if egocentrism 
affects discourse production, then it is possible that egocentrism also will affect comprehension 
of text. If egocentrism affects comprehension, then individuals with RHD may interpret stories 
or outcomes in light of their own personal biases or preferences about story characters, 
regardless of contextual cues that may suggest an alternative interpretation (Blake, 2008).   
A competing hypothesis is that adults with RHD will be less affected by personal 
preferences than adults without brain damage due to reduced affect and emotional processing 
ability (Blake, 2002; Myers, 1999).  If so, then adults with RHD may be less likely to process or 
develop likes/dislikes of characters, and will appear to be less “egocentric” in text 
comprehension tasks. 
 The purpose of this study is to examine whether discourse comprehension in adults with 
RHD is affected by character biases. The hypothesis is that comprehenders desire certain 
outcomes based on whether or not they like or dislike a character, and adults with RHD, who 
may have increased egocentrism, will focus on their desired outcomes at the expense of 
contextual cues regarding an alternative outcome. 
              
Procedures 
Participants  
 Potential participants were recruited through senior centers and the second author’s 
existing database of previous research participants. To date seven individuals without brain 
damage and nine with a lesion in the right cerebral hemisphere have participated in the study. 
Inclusion criteria included: right handed, between the ages of 50 and 85 years, learned only 
English before school-age, and have no history of drug or alcohol abuse. The eight individuals 
with RHD had no evidence of lesions in the left hemisphere, and no visuospatial neglect as 
measured by the Behavioural Inattention Test (Wilson, Cockburn & Halligan, 1987) or a 
computer based visual screening test. The seven individuals without brain damage had no 
evidence of cognitive decline (as measured by the Barrow Neurological Institute Screen for 
Higher Cerebral Functions; Prigatano, Amin & Rosenstein, 1995). Select demographic and 
clinical variables are provided in Table 1.  
Methods 
 Forty-eight stimulus stories, derived from Rapp and Gerrig (2006) were used (see 
example in Table 2). Experimental stories contained a factual contextual cue that created a bias 
toward either a positive or negative outcome for the main character. In each experimental story, a 
character bias was included, designed to create a preference toward the opposite outcome. Every 
story had a control version, in which there was a neutral character bias. Following each story 
participants read a question regarding the likelihood of an outcome. The outcome always 
matched the factual bias. Thus, in experimental stories, the queried outcome contradicted the 
character bias. There was no contradiction in the control stories. Participants read each story and 
rated the likelihood of the outcome on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = very unlikely; 5 = very 
likely). Response times for making the likelihood judgment were recorded. If readers were 
influenced by character preferences, then outcomes should be rated as more likely for positive 
character biases as compared to paired control stories and rated as less likely for negative 
character biases as compared to paired control stories. Additionally, it was predicted that rating 
response times should be slower on the experimental (positive/negative) as compared to the 
control stories, because participants would have to consider contradictory information. 
 The study was conducted as a mixed within subjects factorial design, with story condition 
(Positive/Negative/Control) as the within-subjects factors and group (RHD, NBD) as the 
between-subjects factor. Testing took place across two sessions; biased and neutral versions of 
each story never appeared in the same session. 
 
Results 
A set of planned comparisons was used to evaluate the comparisons of interest. Within 
groups, paired sample t tests were conducted to examine differences between ratings on 
experimental and paired control stories. Results indicated that for both NBD and RHD groups, 
outcomes for the negative preference biased stories were rated as less likely to occur as 
compared to the matched neutral stories [NBD: t(6) 3.8, p=0.009; RHD: t(8) 2.6, p=.031]. No 
significant differences within groups were observed for positive preference biased stories and 
their control versions [NBD: t(6) 1.1, p=.31; RHD: t(8) .60, p=.56]. 
Paired, two-tailed t-tests were conducted to examine differences in rating response times. 
For both the NBD and RHD participants, ratings took significantly longer for the negative than 
the neutral stories [NBD: t(6) 3.0, p=0.23; RHD: t(8) 2.7, p=.028,] but no significant differences 
were found for the positive-preference biased stories as compared to the matched neutral stories 
NBD: t(6) .39, p=.709; RHD: t(8) .63, p=.548. 
 Independent t-tests were conducted to examine differences between groups. No 
significant differences were obtained for either ratings or response times (all t(14) <.8, all p>.4).  
   
Discussion/Conclusions 
 Healthy older adults judge outcomes based on personal preferences as well as contextual 
cues, as demonstrated with younger adults (Rapp & Gerrig, 2002, 2006). The results indicated 
that this was true, though, only for negative character biases: Readers did not want positive 
outcomes to occur for characters they did not like. The RHD group exhibited the same pattern, 
indicating that their expectations of outcomes are biased by personal preferences.   
 The hypothesis was not supported: the RHD group did not exhibit effects of egocentrism 
on their perceptions of story outcomes, as observed in the absence of between-group differences. 
One explanation for this finding is that the participants with RHD did not differ from the NBD 
group on a cognitive screening test (t(12) 1.27, p=.23). Thus, the participants with RHD may not 
have had typical RHD characteristics or may not have had egocentrism. Egocentrism was not 
directly tested due to the absence of a standardized measure of egocentrism.  
 Despite not supporting the hypothesized link between egocentrism and discourse 
comprehension, valuable information was obtained. The RHD group was sensitive to negative 
character biases, and to the same extent as the NBD group. This indicates that these individuals 
(at least those with mild cognitive-communication deficits) do rely on personal preferences 
during discourse comprehension. Thus, they are not, as the alternative hypothesis suggested, 
unable to process affective/emotional information. Future work should include a more impaired 
RHD group and a formal measure of egocentrism and affective/emotional processing to further 
explore the effects of these characteristics on comprehension.  
 
 
Table 1. Select demographic and clinical data for two participant groups.  
 NBD (N=7) RHD (N=9) 
















*missing BNI scores for one RHD participant. 
 
 
Table 2. Sample experimental stimuli  
Experimental (negative character bias, 
positive factual bias) 
Control (neutral character bias, positive 
factual bias) 
 
Shelly needed to get up at 7AM in order to 
make it to class on time. 
She laid out her clothes and bag before going 
to bed.  
She hadn’t bothered studying for her test 
because she had stolen a copy of the final 
exam. 
She was an early riser, and never slept in 
after her alarm clock rang. 
Shelly went to bed before 10:00 and had a 
good night’s sleep. 
 
Likelihood question: 
How likely is it that Shelly will awake just 
before her alarm clock rings and arrive at class 
in plenty of time? 
 
 
Shelly needed to get up at 7AM in order to 
make it to class on time. 
She laid out her clothes and bag before going 
to bed.  
Shelley was finished studying for her test and 
was glad she had only one final exam left. 
 
She was an early riser, and never slept in 
after her alarm clock rang. 
Shelly went to bed before 10:00 and had a 
good night’s sleep. 
 
Likelihood question: 
How likely is it that Shelly will awake just 
before her alarm clock rings and arrive at class 
in plenty of time? 
 
  
*character bias in italics; factual bias in bold 
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